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Barriers to Business Relations between Medical Tourism Facilitators and 1 
Medical Professionals engaged in Transnational Healthcare 2 
ABSTRACT  3 
This paper examines facets of the developing business relations between two important actors in the 4 
supply-chain of transnational healthcare: medical tourism facilitators and medical doctors (MDs) 5 
practicing privately and internationalising their services. The empirical focus is Greece, an emerging 6 
destination for medical care. Drawing on the sociology of the professions as an analytical framework, 7 
rich qualitative data reveals a conflictual aspect in the relation between the two actors, and informs the 8 
literature on transnational healthcare of barriers to market development. Particularly, MDs practicing 9 
privately often resist what is perceived to be medical tourism facilitators' pressures to control the 10 
'rules of the game' in the submarket which inhibits their collaboration. The paper contributes, thus, to 11 
the sociology of the professions by bringing to light a new challenge for MDs engaged in the 12 
transnational business arena, represented here by the facilitators; and encourages tourism practitioners 13 
to consider MDs’ self-understanding, attitudes, and expectations. 14 
 15 
Keywords: Medical Tourism Facilitators; Medical Professionals; Transnational Healthcare; Medical 16 
Dominance; Medical Travel/Tourism 17 
 18 
 19 
1. INTRODUCTION 20 
Transnational healthcare refers to the ‘transnational pursuit’ (demand) and ‘transnational 21 
provision’ (supply) of medical care (Bell et al., 2015: 285). The first, either ‘long-distance’ or ‘every 22 
day’ and ‘intra-regional’, is a practice within the transnational healthcare sector (Bell et al., 2015); 23 
according to the World Trade Organisation nomenclature a mode of international trade in health 24 
services. Known also as medical tourism it refers to the travel of a person to a foreign country with 25 
the aim of receiving medical care; with an emphasis on ‘clinical, surgical, and hospital provision’ 26 
(Carrera and Lunt, 2010). On the other hand, the transnational provision of medical care refers to the 27 
‘supply chain’ of care, which includes medical care providers, travel agencies, accommodation, and 28 
Page 2 of 36 
 
transportation services providers (Lee and Fernando, 2015).  There is a growing body of literature 29 
examining aspects of this developing market (Chuang et al., 2014), and yet much remains to be 30 
explored or clarified. There are definitional issues around the term and scope of ‘medical tourism’ 31 
(Connell, 2013; Bolton and Skountridaki, 2017); numeric data are inaccurate or exaggerated (Lunt et 32 
al., 2014); and while patients and national destinations have attracted much scholarly attention 33 
(Ormond et al., 2015), less is known about other key stakeholders such as informal care providers 34 
(Crooks and Snyder, 2015), the role of intermediaries (Connell, 2013), or the experiences of health 35 
professionals (Skountridaki, 2015). Similarly, there is a gap in our knowledge about the dynamics of 36 
the sector; how the transnational healthcare sector evolves and grows, including the interactions 37 
among key actors, and (contextual) factors or initiatives that promote or dissuade industry 38 
developments (Ormond et al., 2015). This paper seeks to address this gap and contribute towards a 39 
deeper understanding of industry developments. One way to do so is to explore the developing 40 
relationships between key actors, especially if market creation is understood as the result of initiatives 41 
and interactions undertaken by various stakeholders. These interactions may involve competition or 42 
cooperation; often a combination of the two. As such, aim of the paper is to provide empirical 43 
evidence on the interactions between two key actors in the supply chain of transnational healthcare 44 
(medical doctors working for small medical providers and medical tourism facilitators) and offer a 45 
theoretical interpretation of this evidence through a sociological approach, the sociology of the 46 
professions. 47 
Overall, academic contributions and media reports offer evidence of several players in health 48 
care considering ways in which internationalisation may prove beneficial for their enterprise, 49 
including medical professionals, private hospitals, and governments (see for example Chee, 2010; 50 
Labonté, 2013b; Ormond, 2015). Except for perceived opportunities, this paper highlights that the 51 
above actors may face new challenges. For example, similar to other industries, transnational 52 
regulatory frameworks such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services or European Union 53 
legislation may limit the policy choices of governments (see for example the analysis on accounting 54 
services by Arnold, 2005). Moreover, as patients move to foreign countries domestic providers may 55 
face increasing international competition; and governments may contest the healthcare provision 56 
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offered by foreign providers to their citizens (as in the case of the Indonesian authorities, Ormond, 57 
2015). In addition, particular actors increase their importance in the international terrain (e.g. 58 
transnational regulatory bodies, accreditation bodies) and new actors appear, i.e. medical tourism 59 
facilitators. The very moment these actors fill a void in the new market, they threaten to differentiate 60 
traditional power balances and potentially forge new dynamics. The focus here is on two key actors 61 
with different background and history; medical doctors (MDs), who try to internationalise their 62 
services by attracting foreign clientele to their private practices (and thus enter into the area of 63 
international entrepreneurship), and medical tourism facilitators, who serve the role of an 64 
intermediary between demand and supply (and thus now enter the health sector and in particular a 65 
niche subsector). Empirically the analysis examines the perceptions of the first over the latter with a 66 
focus on Greece as a destination country for medical services. It is important to note here the 67 
distinction between small practices and large hospitals that together account for the transnational 68 
provision of medical care. While not comparable to large hospitals in terms of size, resources, or the 69 
range of medical services, small providers advertise, attract, and serve a segment of the international 70 
demand (Snyder et al. 2011; Turner 2013). In light of this, this study notes that small providers are 71 
typically run by medical doctors, a body of knowledge-workers meticulously studied for over four 72 
decades by the Sociology of the Professions. Because of its focus on professionals, not least on 73 
medical professionals, this body of literature is deemed useful to shed light on the evolving MD-74 
facilitator relation; particularly from the perspective of MDs. The sociology of the professions 75 
(Larson, 1977; Freidson, 1985; Abbott, 1988) highlights that MDs are incumbents within the 76 
healthcare sector; while this paper offers an example of how private practitioners interpret the 77 
activities of facilitators as challenging medical power. Findings show that numerous MDs in 78 
small/medium private practices do not only do business at an international level (Skountridaki, 2015) 79 
but that interactions for business purposes are deeply politicised. In particular, medical professionals 80 
vie for control over facilitators about who defines the fees and terms of collaboration. Facilitators are 81 
often perceived by medical providers engaging in the international market as a countervailing power 82 
(Light, 1995) in the new field; in particular, some MDs express dissatisfaction with the relationship or 83 
choose to interrupt collaboration with facilitators for reasons which go beyond monetary concerns. 84 
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Friction results, to a certain extent, in delays in the internationalisation process of providers as it limits 85 
the number of provider-facilitator agreements. This mistrust functions as an impediment to market 86 
development and generates the need for alternative forms of collaboration.  87 
This paper contributes to knowledge by offering fresh insights both to the Sociology of the 88 
Professions and the literature on transnational healthcare/medical tourism/travel. The sociology of the 89 
professions examines challenges posed to MDs (both from within the profession and the environment) 90 
and the related collective or individual response. The empirical evidence presented here informs the 91 
literature of a new market-driven challenge for medical professionals engaging in the international 92 
business arena. It also highlights how professionals-owners of small private practices in yet another 93 
development in the healthcare sector - advancing internationalisation – attempt to offset the leverage 94 
of a new actor, facilitators. Facilitators are for many small providers a unique way to reach foreign 95 
clientele. Yet, medical professionals experience the leverage of facilitators as perturbing and remain 96 
cautious in their collaborations, thus limiting the expansion of facilitators’ operations. This 97 
ambivalence of medical professionals working in small medical practices, along with its practical 98 
implications, also advances our understanding of how transnational healthcare grows. As mentioned 99 
above, little is known about the evolving relations of key actors in the supply side which calls for 100 
empirical research aiming to shed light on factors, attitudes, and actions that promote or dissuade 101 
transnational healthcare. In light of this, issues of trust by small medical providers towards facilitators 102 
are observed, and this paper goes deeper to offer a theory-informed insight into why trust is difficult 103 
to establish. Professional norms and attitudes play out as a factor dissuading industry developments. 104 
How successfully medical professionals will tackle the challenge in the long-term is uncertain, 105 
as various factors create a dynamic and complex environment. Facilitators come from the business 106 
world, where medical providers as much in Greece as elsewhere function as small/medium enterprises 107 
competing for market share. Claims over a social purpose and an ethic of service for professionals in a 108 
highly commercialised sector fade, weakening the ideological legitimacy for professionalism 109 
(Skountridaki, 2015). Furthermore, the multinational operation of facilitators places them out of the 110 
state’s jurisdiction where medical professionals have better chances to deploy political resources and 111 
influence their relationships. The international business environment, therefore, coincides with a 112 
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relatively attenuated position for private practitioners. The argument of this paper is presented in five 113 
sections. The second section discusses the emergence of transnational healthcare and presents the two 114 
key actors. It is followed by a presentation of the theory on medical dominance (the Sociology of the 115 
Professions) and how this is applied to the Greek context. The fourth section discusses the 116 
methodology and the fifth presents the qualitative data. The final section discusses the findings and 117 
concludes the paper.  118 
2. DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF 119 
HEALTHCARE 120 
Glinos et al. (2010: 1145) suggest that transnational healthcare is a growing sector not well 121 
monitored or understood. They aptly comment that it ‘goes beyond the conventional territorial logic’ 122 
and ‘it functions according to different incentives, rules and structures’. The authors take a demand-123 
side approach and explore why patients go abroad and how their expenses are covered. On the other 124 
hand, this paper takes a supply-side approach to explore how relations among key actors evolve. 125 
When considering the rules and structures of the sector (the context in which key actors interact), it is 126 
important to highlight that transnational provision is, to a great extent, profit driven. Though cross-127 
border collaboration at a state and non-commercial level is apparent, it is most often related to lack of 128 
resources in a particular region (e.g. EU, Rosenmöller et al., 2006) or medical know-how (e.g. African 129 
countries, Crush et al., 2012). Commercial incentives and practices are, otherwise, pervasive within 130 
the sector. Arguably, commercialisation implies the conceptualisation of healthcare as a service and 131 
the delivery of cross-border care as a form of international trade; profit maximisation incentives for 132 
providers; advancement of corporate structures at the organisational level; and an augmented 133 
importance of business practices such as marketing (Labonté, 2013a). Commercialisation is 134 
manifested in various ways. For example, often under the auspices of governments, large medical 135 
providers in (potential) ‘medical tourism destinations’ organise marketing campaigns abroad to attract 136 
foreign patients (Crooks et al., 2011); entrepreneurs search for investment opportunities globally, 137 
while renowned hospitals seize the opportunity to promote their brand as a form of accreditation for 138 
hospitals elsewhere that try to internationalise (Chantarakarn et al., 2013; Hopkins et al, 2010). The 139 
internet plays a significant role (Lunt et al., 2009) and business fairs emerge as important venues for 140 
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business arrangements among providers, insurers, and facilitators who attend hoping to ‘make a deal’ 141 
(Labonté, 2013b). Characteristic is also the exports orientation exhibited by small providers; arguably, 142 
the necessitated deployment of entrepreneurial and marketing skills at an international level comprises 143 
a novelty for most of these providers. While similar structures and incentives may appear 144 
commonplace in some countries (i.e. the US), commercial practices such as marketing and advertising 145 
are restricted in other jurisdictions (e.g. Greece, Taiwan, Turkey etc.). The international field, 146 
however, is open to a wider range of commercial practices. Providers or facilitators may exploit 147 
differences in national regulatory frameworks. For example, Polish dental practices may not be able to 148 
advertise in Greece but they can advertise in in-flight magazines in one of the London-Athens 149 
connections; and Greek MDs may not be able to add commercial content to a website with the 150 
national extension (.gr) but the law cannot refrain them from doing so in websites with foreign 151 
extensions (e.g. .com) or on facilitators’ websites when based abroad. 152 
New actors also gain importance in the transnational context. These include ‘medical tourism’ 153 
facilitators, international accreditation and regulatory bodies, and stakeholders from the tourism 154 
sector. In particular, medical tourism facilitators aggregate and coordinate the demand (patients 155 
seeking care abroad) and supply (medical providers) of health services; they are often called to fill the 156 
gap of cultural and language differences, and help with transportation and accommodation 157 
arrangements of patients, or the preparation of medical records. At the same time, as they fill a void in 158 
the market they also increase provider competition, while they often mediate the traditionally intimate 159 
patient-provider relationship (Snyder et al., 2011). In addition, accreditation bodies facilitate market 160 
developments in a distinct mode in comparison to medical tourism facilitators. They certify that 161 
medical providers adhere to internationally recognised quality standards (Woodhead, 2014), and, 162 
therefore, mitigate the problem of trust and support market expansion. They substitute an important 163 
function usually undertaken by the state, which also illustrates how international structures overcome 164 
national ones. Similarly, the importance of transnational regulatory bodies, such as the European 165 
Commission within the EU context, increases. Whereas healthcare has been long excused from 166 
European integration, EU is now a zone of advanced initiatives (Jarman and Greer, 2009), with 167 
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European laws increasingly intervening in national healthcare systems under the rationale of a 168 
common market and the premise that patient mobility comprises a fundamental EU citizen right.  169 
The above examples reveal current micro- and macro dynamics in transnational healthcare 170 
initiated by various stakeholders. The remainder of this section focuses on the role and practices of 171 
both actors as depicted in the literature and attempts to identify sources of potential conflict before 172 
discussing the findings of the empirical study. 173 
2.1. Medical Tourism Facilitators: a new business sector 174 
Medical tourism web portals and agencies are synonymous to the internationalisation of 175 
healthcare. Their presence in the UK, US, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere, can be traced from the 176 
early 2000s (Turner, 2011). They appeared when growing numbers of patients searching for 177 
information online and seeking treatment abroad signalled a new opportunity for business (Turner, 178 
2012; Lunt et al., 2011). Soon they became a key actor offering services to both patients and medical 179 
providers. Turner (2013) highlights the importance of the internet in facilitators’ business and 180 
suggests that the internet functions as a ‘global marketing platform’ where individuals seeking private 181 
healthcare discover facilitators and hospitals beyond their country of residence. As significant number 182 
of these individuals contact facilitators to obtain information on overseas healthcare a lesser number 183 
use their services to arrange treatment abroad (Snyder et al., 2011). Facilitators offer ‘case 184 
management services’ to patients related to the medical component of the trip, including country and 185 
provider recommendation, screening of medical history, preparation for hospitalisation, 186 
teleconference with surgeons, along with services related to travelling arrangements, such as lodge 187 
recommendation, airfare tickets, visa application, and tourism packages. It is notable that patients do 188 
not always pay a fee to facilitators; often it is medical providers who compensate them (Spence, 189 
2009), thus highlighting that facilitators offer important services to medical providers, which include, 190 
among others, advertising, patient reference, patient preparation for the trip and/or hospitalisation.  191 
There is diversity in the operations and services of facilitators. Facilitators may operate as a web 192 
portal administrated either by a private company or a governmental organisation (Lunt et al., 2009). 193 
They may provide information on one or multiple medical facilities; focus on one or multiple 194 
destinations (Lunt et al., 2009); and be based in patients’ destination or origin country (Frederick and 195 
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Gan, 2015). According to research on 173 facilitators across the continents, most ‘non Western’ 196 
facilitators focus on one destination country, whereas the majority of Western facilitators focus on 197 
multiple destinations (Frederick and Gan, 2015). Moreover, their representatives may have limited or 198 
no physical contact with patients and medical providers. Others may communicate with patients (and 199 
medical providers) in a more personalised way; meeting patients several times before they travel 200 
abroad and inspect providers’ facilities and credentials.  201 
Facilitators may refer patients to providers without involvement in the medical procedures or 202 
travel. Dalstrom (2013) refers to this as ‘referral service’ facilitators to emphasise their role in 203 
connecting a medical provider with a patient without arranging travel and/or medical logistical 204 
procedures. Facilitators that play a greater role in patient travel and decision-making are the ‘full 205 
service’ facilitators and the ‘individual service’ facilitators (Dalstrom, 2013). The first make medical 206 
and travel arrangements and may offer customised packages to patients, while the latter help patients 207 
who are already in the destination country/town to choose a practice, understand laws and procedures, 208 
and, through translation services, communicate with providers. In the same spirit, Snyder et al. (2011) 209 
make a distinction between brokers and facilitators with the first having a limited role towards 210 
patients (typically referring patients to medical providers) and the latter having a more active role (in 211 
that they offer extensive advice and may even serve as patient advocates). In this paper the focus is on 212 
the common denominator of the intermediating services of facilitators (that is the limited role of 213 
referring patients to providers) rather than the differences in the configuration of additional services. 214 
In light of this, the ‘facilitator’ is adopted as a generic term. When deemed meaningful for the 215 
analysis, full service or referral facilitators are explicitly distinguished, in line with Dalstrom’s 216 
analysis (2013). Moreover, where mentioned, ‘broker’ is understood as a synonym to referral service 217 
facilitators.  218 
Facilitators’ contribution to the development of the transnational market has further ramifications. 219 
Hopkins et al. (2010) mention that facilitators promote agreements with insurance companies in an 220 
effort to advance developments in the field. The current research also shows that representatives of 221 
facilitators approach providers in various countries to sell their services. They offer a ready 222 
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mechanism which providers may easily join (for an annual subscription or payment per reference) 223 
augmenting the international supply. 224 
Concerns over facilitators and their practices are widespread in the literature, though criticism 225 
mainly focuses on implications for patients (Lunt et al., 2009; Penney et al., 2011). On the one hand, 226 
characterised by high rates of business entry and exit, it is perceived as a ‘turbulent’ sector (Cormany 227 
and Baloglu, 2010; Turner, 2012). On the other hand, it is the strong commercial character of 228 
facilitators (Lunt et al., 2009; Labonté, 2013b), coupled with lack of regulation, that causes concern 229 
(Turner, 2011); particularly as a significant number of facilitators exhibit a tendency to emphasise 230 
benefits and downplay risks of treatment overseas (Mason and Wright, 2011).  Low cost, high-quality 231 
services, and doctors’ expertise are usually promoted (Mason and Wright, 2011). Similarly, factors 232 
such as convenience, 24/7 services, friendly healthcare personnel, and assignment of a personal 233 
assistant in the destination country (Sobo et al., 2011), or even exotic destinations (Crush et al., 2012: 234 
26), are emphasised. In contrast, health risks are downplayed. Just a minority of reviewed sites in the 235 
US and Canada includes information on malpractice, complications, post-operative care, and legal 236 
liability (Mason and Wright, 2011: 170; Penney et al., 2011). Parallel to this, credibility is often based 237 
on patient testimonials (Mason and Wright, 2011) and simple statements (Penney, 2011). 238 
Conceptually, medical travel is often promoted by facilitators’ websites both as a fashionable and 239 
conventional behaviour re-occurring through centuries (Sobo et al., 2011). US agencies employ the 240 
narrative of patient empowerment, presenting the individual as liberated from gate-keepers and/or 241 
social pressure to decide about their healthcare (Sobo et al., 2011). Facilitators also try to tackle 242 
patients’ concerns over individual responsibility (towards populations at the destination country or the 243 
opportunity to ‘jump’ waiting lists) and present price differences as a result of ‘neutral’ factors (lower 244 
cost of living at destination, lower physician fees, and currency differentiations) (Sobo et al., 2011).  245 
Lack of regulation over the practice, however, may entail considerable uncertainty for medical 246 
providers too. Information asymmetry potentially passes control to agents over prices, the services, 247 
and the choice of buyers/sellers. MDs, who lack knowledge over foreign markets, may depend on 248 
them in order to internationalise but lack information mechanisms to control their activities. In light of 249 
this, MDs’ aversion to facilitators’ ability to control the market is anticipated. More so when 250 
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considering MDs as a traditionally dominant actor in the healthcare field with most other actors being 251 
either subordinates (i.e. other health occupations) or partners (state, pharmaceuticals). With regards to 252 
challengers (healthcare purchasers, patient advocates, the state, other professions) the theory of 253 
professions offers rich literature on how MDs strive to maintain their position. 254 
2.2. The Role of MDs in Building the Market 255 
Medical doctors’ role and perspective on the internationalisation of healthcare vary to a great extent. 256 
Some MDs tend to highlight their concerns with patient movement, while others have an active role in 257 
the expansion of the phenomenon. For example, medical doctors in South Africa have actively 258 
pursued international clientele (Crush et al., 2012: 23). Despite restrictions on advertisements, 259 
professional websites, facilitators, referrals and networks, thus, have significantly supported the 260 
endeavour (Crush et al., 2012). Similarly, the first efforts of the Singaporean state to attract foreigners 261 
in the 1980’s, lagged behind the initiatives of some MDs (Chee, 2010: 341). In Costa Rica before 262 
large investors paid attention to cosmetic surgery ‘tourism’, plastic surgeons had started accepting 263 
clients from the US in collaboration with hotel owners (Ackerman, 2010: 406). Other examples of 264 
entrepreneurial initiatives by MDs in the literature include the case of a Portuguese medical doctor 265 
who established a clinic with spa facilities in Macao (Lam et al., 2011: 71), MDs who move to Greece 266 
aiming at foreign clientele (Skountridaki, 2015), and a South African agency which is owned and run 267 
by MDs (Crush et al., 2012: 27). Online research shows a number of similar cases across the 268 
continents
i
. The above cases illustrate examples of medics who, similar to large providers, try to seize 269 
the perceived business opportunities of patients seeking healthcare far from home. 270 
Yet, other medical professionals remain sceptical to the practice. Several Costa Rican surgeons 271 
voice critique of colleagues leaving the public sector to service foreigners for higher rewards 272 
(Ackerman, 2010: 407).  In India, Maheshwari et al. (2012), who work as physicians in a cardiac care 273 
unit consulting foreign patients, call on governments to take action to meet local needs and interrupt 274 
patient outflows. Based on medical, economic, and moral grounds, scepticism is also expressed by 275 
medical doctors in ‘origin’ countries, such as the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and Germany (Birch et 276 
al., 2010; Barrowman et al., 2010; Caulfield & Zarzeczny, 2012;  Cheung and Wilson, 2007; Foss, 277 
2012; Jeevan & Armstrong, 2008; Jones & McCullough, 2007;  McKelvey et al., 2009; Mattoras, 278 
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2005; Miyagi et al., 2011; Pimlott, 2012; Terzi et al., 2008; Wachter, 2006). The most commonly 279 
cited reason refers to increased health risks and is often supported by the authors’ own experience 280 
with patient complications after treatment abroad. For example, Birch et al. (2011) provide evidence 281 
on urgent surgeries they performed in their clinic in Canada on patients who had bariatric surgery 282 
overseas, while Barrowman et al. (2010) present five cases of patients treated in hospitals in 283 
Melbourne, Australia who had suffered complication after dental treatment abroad. Moreover, Jeevan 284 
and Armstrong (2008) suggest that in the UK 37% of 203 certified plastic surgeons who responded to 285 
a survey commissioned by the British Association of Plastic, Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons 286 
(BAPRAS) in 2007, had seen patients with post-operative complications after surgery overseas. In 287 
light of this, collective agency has also been initiated. For example, the Canadian medical community 288 
of fertility and andrology aims at restraining patient movement (Inhorn and Patrizio, 2009: 905), 289 
while several plastic surgery associations (BAPRAS, ISAPS, ASAPS), though not always 290 
categorically opposed to the practice, have moved fast to prepare guidelines for patients (Miyagi et 291 
al., 2011). In some cases, competition is blurred with concerns over health issues. Empirical research 292 
suggests that MDs in origin countries maintain a reserved or even ‘antagonistic’ sentiment towards 293 
facilitators or foreign MDs (Snyder et al., 2011). For example there are accounts of patients who 294 
travelled abroad without informing their family doctors, anticipating that they would be dismissive of 295 
their decision (Johnston et al., 2012). Moreover, Canadian facilitators feel that MDs in Canada 296 
sometimes move patients ‘front of waiting lists in order to dissuade them from travelling abroad’; 297 
often avoid talking to facilitators or overseas MDs ‘because that means that they’re approving the 298 
process’; or may avoid collaboration as ‘it’s a kind of a professional suicide’ (Snyder et al., 2011, p. 299 
532). 300 
Further academic research in various regions across the continents is essential for a deeper 301 
understanding of medical professionals’ stance and the nature of competition emerging within the 302 
profession. What becomes clear is that the positioning of medical doctors plays a role in how they 303 
perceive and interpret developments in the international market. 304 
3. MDs AS INCUMBENTS WITHIN  HEALTHCARE PROVISION 305 
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MDs can be understood as incumbents within the healthcare sector, and in that matter the 306 
Sociology of the Professions explains masterfully how and why MDs have come to occupy this place 307 
in a number of societies (Johnson, 1972; Larson, 1977; Starr, 1982; Abbott, 1988; Macdonald, 1995; 308 
Freidson, 2001). Medical dominance was originally sanctioned by several states with an aspiration to 309 
provide universal access to healthcare during the 20
th
 century (Johnson, 1972; Starr, 1982). It refers to 310 
the autonomy of MDs over the organisation and content of their work and, simultaneously, to power 311 
asymmetries within healthcare provision that advantage medical professionals over other 312 
stakeholders. Power asymmetries are typically observed between MDs and patients (manifested in the 313 
patriarchal doctor-patient relationship); and between MDs and members of other health occupations 314 
working closely together (most notably nursing staff). After state-introduced managerialism or 315 
market-driven corporatism, power struggles over who controls the organisation of healthcare are also 316 
observed between MDs and administrators/ managers in numerous states (Kirkpatrick et al., 2009). 317 
Though the international literature highlights the ‘assault’ on medical autonomy and dominance 318 
following its golden era (identified around the 1960s by Elliott Freidson in liberal economies, 2001), 319 
authority and power asymmetries persist to a considerable extent. 320 
Freidson notes (1993: 55; 2001) that control over content of work by professionals -instead of 321 
consumers (the market) or administrators (bureaucracy) - serves as the cornerstone of medical 322 
autonomy. This form of power refers to the right of MDs to define disease, diagnose illness, and 323 
decide on the type of treatment for patients (Harrison and Ahmad, 2001). Their ‘ability’ to do so is 324 
exclusive and grounded on their unique set of skills, knowledge, and expertise. Medical knowledge is, 325 
thus, a key resource for power and autonomy; while its discretionary application, strengthens the 326 
ability of professionals to resist routinisation of their daily work (Doolin, 2002: 374; Hamilton, 2008: 327 
102) even under significant external pressures. McLaughlin and Webster (1998) show, for example, 328 
how medics drew on particular resources (legal rights over diagnosis, the dis-attachment of 329 
professional skills from the hospital as an organisation, and their membership to the profession) to 330 
preserve power and control after the introduction of new technology in a micrology lab. In contrast, 331 
the scientific personnel in the same lab proved unable to inhibit deskilling and the downgrading of 332 
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their position. As such, medical professionals often maintain the right to define their fees and own 333 
conditions of labour (Flynn, 1999: 22).  334 
Albeit increasingly contested, authority over other actors within healthcare provision including 335 
patients and nursing staff is another distinctive feature of medical dominance. MDs typically draw on 336 
their superior medical knowledge and skills to reinforce existing power asymmetries in their relation 337 
with patients and the public. Carvalho and Nunes (2013) observe that this occurs repeatedly in a 338 
number of contexts, 339 
‘Studies of participatory procedures involving both scientists/experts and lay members of 340 
publics have documented how the agendas of scientists and experts tend to set the terms of their 341 
engagements and thus reiterate the epistemic authority of scientific/technical knowledge’ 342 
(Carvalho and Nunes, 2013). 343 
 In the consulting room, in particular, MDs are often criticised for cultivating a patriarchal 344 
patient-doctor relationship which traditionally promotes relatively limited participation in decision 345 
making over treatment. Consumerism and the push for ‘patient choice’ in healthcare, most recently, 346 
promote, in contrast, more equal forms of interaction and aim at restraining physicians from defining 347 
the terms of communication with patients (Mold, 2013). Similarly, physicians may define the terms of 348 
engagement and the behaviour they will adopt towards members of other occupations they work 349 
closely with. Power asymmetries in the form of subordination of other groups in the division of labour 350 
are grounded on the perpetuation of a successfully promoted image of other occupations as inferior. 351 
For example, nurses are traditionally offering ‘an adjunct service supporting real curative (medial) 352 
processes’ (Salhani and Coulter, 2009: 1223); medical doctors often pass on to them tasks perceived 353 
as ‘dirty’ (Freidson, 1988); and exercise control over their work and training. In response, nurses 354 
often show a form of deference to MDs (Keddy et al., 1986; Porter, 1993) or, most recently, may try 355 
to ‘decisively differentiate nursing from medicine’ and mitigate power asymmetries through ‘the 356 
continuing development of a theoretical and research base intended to clarify nursing knowledge’ 357 
(Salhani and Coulter, 2009: 1223). Another intriguing relation is the one between MDs and 358 
pharmaceutical enterprises, with commentators mainly focusing on the legal and moral concerns 359 
raised by the commercial aspect of their interaction (Margolis, 1991). In particular, pharmaceuticals 360 
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offer MDs minor or expensive gifts, free lunches, and the sponsoring of educational activities, 361 
conferences, and trips. MDs then decide to what extent they accept such provisions alongside the 362 
commercial aspect in their relation. The interests for pharmaceuticals lay to the influence they 363 
exercise upon MDs’ pharmaceutical choice through presents (Peay and Peay, 1988; Halperin et al., 364 
2004) given that the latter directly control drug consumption and, thus, affect drug sales and industry 365 
profits. Again, as in the patient-doctor or nurse-doctor relationships, MDs’ legal and exclusionary 366 
right to define illness and therapy (in this case prescribe drugs) promotes a relation with a key 367 
stakeholder in the supply chain in which, irrespective to moral concerns, MDs can define the degree 368 
of engagement. 369 
The literature carefully highlights, however, that professional dominance is ‘contextual’ in 370 
nature (Light, 1995: 26), therefore renegotiated as changes occur in the socio-economic environment 371 
(Dent, 2007; Light, 1995). This paper looks into the challenge facilitators pose to medical 372 
professionals in Greece trying to internationalise their services. As newcomers in the field, facilitators 373 
wish to partner with providers; and get a commission; the business to business relation does not 374 
include, however, a special position for medics. The relationship may, first, foster market competition 375 
with providers that use the same facilitators in a range of countries. Some of these facilitators grow 376 
much greater in size and turnover than the small/medium medical practices they work with. They may 377 
contract large or small medical providers internationally according to their changing interests or 378 
demand fluctuations; proving that international competition is stiff and scarcity in medical skill 379 
unimportant within the niche market. The power of facilitators to aggregate the (international) supply-380 
side mitigates, thus, the power of medical professionals to set the terms of their engagement. The 381 
sociology of the professions anticipates that medical professionals are inclined to project power 382 
asymmetries in the new context whilst this paper offers evidence of medical professionals in Greece 383 
trying to reassert the authority of medicine in a sphere where it proves to have little currency; as such 384 
MDs-owners of private practices who seek to internationalise their services are alarmed by the 385 
increased options and negotiating power of (mainly referral but also full service) facilitators they are 386 
in contact with.  387 
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Moreover, the transnational healthcare sector is entwined with a demand for additional services 388 
in comparison to domestic provision; complementary to medical care and yet inextricably linked to 389 
medical travel, so that the problem of how (by whom and under what circumstances) these will be 390 
offered emerges. In particular, small in size medical practices run by MDs need skill in international 391 
patient management, advertising, and networking in order to internationalise, tasks for which MDs 392 
traditionally have no training. The need thus to bring in skill and/or collaborate with facilitators to 393 
undertake tasks and responsibilities in the international context implies dependency. Simultaneously, 394 
the ability of facilitators to aggregate the demand side implies that it is professionals that wish to gain 395 
access to facilitators’ client base (in a reverse situation to the one with pharmaceuticals, for example) 396 
which implies lack of leverage in negotiations. Furthermore, for as long as facilitators bring in clients, 397 
they have room to intervene in the patient-doctor relationship by setting service requirements to 398 
providers, and by promoting a self-claimed patient advocacy role for themselves (Snyder et al., 2011). 399 
As such, the international market appears significantly different than the national health provision; 400 
resources and tactics may need significant adaptation if professionals are to expand their privileged 401 
position in the internationalised context in the long-term. While professionals often act collectively, 402 
this piece of work focuses on the uncoordinated reaction of MDs in Greece to what is perceived as 403 
pressure from another actor. Against the backdrop of increased competition and lack of a true 404 
representative body, coordinated action is inhibited. Yet, the tacit self-understanding of MDs as 405 
incumbents puts them into a position to negotiate and, to a great extent, maintain a similar line of 406 
action vis-a vis medical tourism facilitators.  407 
4. HEALTHCARE IN GREECE: ORIENTATION TO EXPORTS & MEDICAL 408 
DOMINANCE 409 
Though a latecomer, Greece is increasingly engaging in the medical tourism market. As in 410 
renowned Asian destinations (Thailand and Malaysia, see Chee, 2010), the recent crisis has given 411 
strong incentives to various stakeholders to consider the potential of internationalising the domestic 412 
healthcare sector. For the last two years, seminars, mini-conferences, and other events on medical 413 
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tourism are increasingly organised, emphasing that the idea of healthcare exports has matured
1
. A 414 
number of large private hospitals in the country have recently started developing a strategy (e.g. 415 
Hygeia Group; Metropolitan Hospital; Athens Medical Group; and Group Iaso); nonetheless, it is 416 
MDs in small practices that account for the bulk of patient inflows in Greece. As in a few other cases 417 
mentioned earlier, practitioners have been pioneers. According to interviewees involved in this 418 
research, aesthetic and reconstructive plastic surgery, fertility treatment, dental care, physiotherapy, 419 
orthopaedic, bariatric and eye surgery are services offered to foreigners visiting Greece for healthcare. 420 
MDs’ initiatives and incentives with regards to internationalisation of their services are characterised 421 
as entrepreneurial and profit-driven (Skountridaki, 2015). In particular, MDs take advantage of 422 
networks they have developed: first, with foreign patients during previous working experience abroad; 423 
and second, with colleagues in foreign countries they may know from conferences or international 424 
training (Skountridaki, 2015). Moreover, several advertise their services online, collaborate with 425 
facilitators, or have a representative in a foreign country (Skountridaki, 2015). To place these 426 
initiatives and the argument of this paper in the Greek context it is vital to illustrate the prominent 427 
position of MDs within the country. 428 
MDs in a number of countries have experienced significant pressures leading to partial loss of 429 
control over the function of the healthcare sector. These include corporatism, managerialism, 430 
insurance companies’ increasing role (Domagalski, 2007; Scott, 2008), but also consumerism which is 431 
related both to commercialisation (Timmermans and Oh, 2010) and liberation from the traditionally 432 
patriarchal patient-doctor relationship (Mold, 2013). In Greece (though research is limited) it can be 433 
argued that such pressures are relatively weak (Andri and Kyriakidou, 2014). Some change is evident 434 
within the public sector in the debt crisis era (Andri and Kyriakidou, 2014). Yet, there is little 435 
                                                          
1
 For example, medical tourism conferences (e.g. Developing Medical Tourism in Greece 2012; Greek Health 
Tourism Integration Conference 2014); seminars advising MDs how to promote their services abroad (e.g. 
Dental Tourism Awareness Day, Athens 2015); conferences organised by the Ministries of Health and Tourism 
announcing plans and progress on policies (e.g. Medical Tourism in Practice, Athens, 2013 and Medical 
Tourism in Practice, Thessaloniki 2014); streams in business exhibitions (e.g. the Money Show 2013) or in 
medical conferences, where business experts and success stories of medical professionals share their 
experience and knowledge. Participants and presenters are international business experts; medical doctors; 
facilitators; hospital managers; researchers/academics, hoteliers and government officers. 
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indication of significant pressures exercised by external actors on MDs practicing privately, other than 436 
competitive forces (Skountridaki, 2015). 437 
Greece has a profitable private healthcare sector and simultaneously an inefficient national 438 
system that since it was established back in the 1980s never fulfilled its aim to provide free public 439 
service (Cabiedes and Guillen, 2001). The main reason is that the clientelistic nature of the doctor-440 
patient relationship did not cease after the creation of the Greek National Health care Service (NHS) 441 
but instead took the form of illegal informal payments, giving rise to corruption (Cabiedes and 442 
Guillen, 2001). Simultaneously, since the1980s the number of physicians grew rapidly; 2011 data 443 
show that Greece has almost double the OECD average in practicing physicians and more than double 444 
the UK and US ratio, ranking first among all OECD countries with 6.14 physicians per 1000 445 
inhabitants (OECD, 2014). More than 58% of these physicians are specialist medical practitioners.  446 
General practitioners in contrast, constitute less than 5% of the total, the lowest percentage among 447 
OECD countries. The remaining 37% of MDs has no specialisation or wait in the long lists for 448 
specialisation (OECD, 2014).  With regards to specialists, the large majority in Greece (65%) 449 
comprises the backbone of the private sector; solo private practices have been estimated at more than 450 
20 thousand back in 2005 (Tountas et al., 2005). Today, there are over 22 thousand private practices 451 
in Greece (excluding the nearly 14 thousand dental practices) according to online information 452 
provided by the Greek Ministry of Health (2015). While MDs working as public servants (e.g. in 453 
public hospitals) cannot practice privately, private practitioners may be contracted by the national 454 
insurance fund for a predefined number of consultations per month and a fixed fee.   455 
It is also interesting to note the relation between private practitioners and private hospitals. 456 
Most often private hospitals’ founders and shareholders have been (groups of) medical doctors; it is 457 
only recently that businessmen entered the healthcare sector (Economou, 2010). Moreover, MDs 458 
traditionally maintain a provider-client relationship with private hospitals instead of a salaried one. 459 
MDs typically hold their private practice and use hospital facilities (operation theatres, medical 460 
equipment, diagnosis services) on a case by case basis. Patients directly visit small practices; 461 
therefore, MDs have control over private expenditure and the model is one where the supply induces 462 
the demand with financial benefits for doctors, hospitals and diagnostic centres in the private sector. 463 
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Supply-induced demand is identified as a major issue within healthcare provision in Greece 464 
(Economou, 2010, Skalkidis et al., 1996; Tountas et al., 2005). Unsurprisingly, private healthcare 465 
expenditure as percentage of GDP is high (3.2%), ranking second among the OECD countries 466 
(OECD, 2014). Financing of private healthcare comes from private and public expenditure with the 467 
latter being considerably lower than the first (Economou, 2010). Therefore, it is basically private 468 
expenditure that covers costs in the private sector directly paid by patients out of pocket; according to 469 
Economou (2010: 47) only 2.1% of total health expenditure is covered by private insurance. 470 
In summary, MDs play an active, arguably entrepreneurial role in the private healthcare 471 
provision in Greece (Skountridaki, 2015). MDs are the owners of many private hospitals; and the 472 
majority maintain a loose collaboration with private hospitals instead of a salaried relation; combined 473 
with an absence of private insurance companies (that usually audit medical expenditure), private 474 
practitioners in Greece have effectively managed to avoid external pressures from key players in 475 
healthcare (Skountridaki, 2015). Yet, in the post-crisis era pressures are placed on MDs by market 476 
competition. Competition is exacerbated by the curbed domestic demand due to a dramatic decrease 477 
in the disposal income of locals (OECD, 2014a), coupled with an oversupply of MDs (OECD, 2014b) 478 
concentrated in urban areas. It is notable that MDs have created a strong current of outward migration 479 
during the last few years exceeding the number of 7500 practitioners between 2010 and July 2015 480 
(Kathimerini, 2015). Within that context, internationalisation among practitioners and private 481 
hospitals increasingly gains popularity. 482 
5. METHODOLOGY 483 
The empirical findings of this paper are based on semi-structured interviews conducted in Greece 484 
in 2012. Participants included 32 health professionals working in private practices. Medical 485 
professionals specialised in plastic surgery, ophthalmology, In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF), dental care, 486 
and cardiac surgery. Interviews were also conducted with a psychologist and a midwife and two 487 
hospital managers. MDs interviewed are well-respected professionals compensated on a fee-for-488 
service basis. Medical professionals work exclusively in the private sector as solo practitioners or in 489 
small partnerships; three also hold offices within a private hospital but maintain their personal 490 
website. At the time of fieldwork, hospitals had not yet developed a strategy with regards to 491 
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international patients/markets; the interviewees counted on their own reputation and efforts to attract 492 
foreign patients. Some hospital groups, however, closely followed the international developments and 493 
were in the process of developing a strategy or examining the prospects. In contrast, public providers 494 
in Greece have not taken any steps in internationalising their services, whilst, to the best knowledge of 495 
the author, the Ministry of Health has not announced a plan to do so in the future. All interviewees, 496 
except for three, had specialisation training and/or work experience in other Western countries, 497 
mainly the UK and USA.  498 
To enlist potential interviewees, an online search was conducted through the Google search engine 499 
using keywords such as ‘surgery’, ‘treatment’, ‘dental care’ in combination to location names (i.e. 500 
‘Athens’, ‘Crete’, ‘Rhodes’). The online search was exhaustive with respect to locations, i.e. the 501 
researcher looked all over Greece for potential interviewees. The search showed that practices 502 
advertising services to foreign patients are in the urban centres of the country where medical facilities 503 
are mainly concentrated (Athens and Thessaloniki) and on a few of the islands or coastal regions. 504 
Therefore, participants were approached in Athens, a metropolitan area, and the island of Crete, an 505 
area in the periphery with relatively good healthcare facilities and high international tourism demand. 506 
The interviewees were approached based on their professional webpage and the criterion employed 507 
was whether the website has a version in foreign language(s). This was perceived as a sign of interest 508 
in foreign markets. Only in two cases was there no real interest. The number of MDs fulfilling the 509 
criterion was at the time slightly exceeding one hundred for Athens and Crete. This implies that the 510 
number of 32 interviews is a satisfactory sample. While Greece has yet to develop a booming 511 
industry, patients travel to Athens or Crete for healthcare from a wide range of countries. Countries 512 
mentioned most often during the interviews are UK, Cyprus, Scandinavian countries, and the USA. 513 
Interviewees mention to a lesser extent people visiting from Australia, Canada, Italy, France, 514 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands but also Middle East and N. Africa. 515 
 Interviewees were approached either through email, telephone, or through a short visit to their 516 
working place where the interviewee had the chance to briefly meet them in-between their medical 517 
appointments and explain the aims of the study in person. The interviews took place in the working 518 
space of the interviewees except for one which took place in a central café in Athens. One interview 519 
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was in English as the participant does not speak Greek, with the rest of the interviews conducted in 520 
Greek. Interviews lasted from 20 minutes to two hours, were transcribed, and then translated in 521 
English where needed. Though most interviewees were not familiar with qualitative research, they 522 
were welcome and open to share their experiences and perspective. In few cases, rapport was 523 
established after the first 10-15 minutes of discussion, whilst all participants were interested in the 524 
research topic. The semi-structured interview guide included questions on perceptions about the 525 
phenomenon of medical tourism broadly and in Greece in particular; perceptions on the developments 526 
forging the sector currently and in the future; and personal experiences with various actors such as 527 
foreign patients, the state, and facilitators. Given the exploratory nature of this research, in depth-528 
interviews are deemed suitable as they allow room for participants to express themselves in their own 529 
words (May, 2001:121), and helps the researcher look into their ‘own perspective on their lived 530 
world’ (Kvale, 1996: 105), and their layered motives and beliefs, within contextual complexity 531 
(Cavaya, 1996).  532 
 After the interviews were transcribed the researcher became immersed in the data, reading the 533 
interviews multiple times and comparing perceptions and views. Repeated themes had a number 534 
assigned and were then organised into several logical thematic parts distinguished into context-535 
related; perception-related; and processes or events that affect the evolution of developments 536 
(Wiersma, 1995: 217). After interrelating them with insights from the sociology of the professions, 537 
three major themes emerged. As most participants shared their experiences with facilitators, their 538 
relationship came across as a major discussion topic. The dissatisfaction towards facilitators was not 539 
anticipated, which highlights the role of qualitative research into generating genuine insights in 540 
aspects of real life phenomena (Patton, 2002). Following the logic of abduction, insights were framed 541 
through theory; arguably, ‘facts do not speak for themselves; they must be interpreted’ (Denzin, 1978 542 
cited in Patton, 2002). Here, the micro-politics between professionals and facilitators are largely 543 
conceived within the framework of professional dominance, according to which professionals tend to 544 
impose their control over the work of other actors in healthcare supply (Freidson, 1985). 545 
Interviewees refer to facilitators who are registered in foreign Western countries (mostly the UK) 546 
and some have Greek representatives. They rarely refer to local facilitators, implying limited local 547 
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business activity. All participants except for two had communicated (via emails, calls or in person) 548 
with at least one facilitator. Three interviewees had collaboration with facilitators earlier than 2006, 549 
and the rest have been in contact with facilitators typically after 2007-2008. Some never entered into 550 
agreement after seriously considering the prospect or interrupted collaboration; and yet all participants 551 
but one state that they are interested in intermediating and advertising services. Interviewees discuss 552 
about referral rather than full service facilitators (Table 1) - while there is no evidence to suggest that 553 
‘individual’ facilitators operate in Greece (Dalstrom, 2013). MDs mainly refer to web portals that list 554 
medical providers in multiple destinations and do not provide travel and/or medical arrangements to 555 
patients. Nevertheless, a plastic surgeon refers to a terminated collaboration with a full service 556 
facilitator, a one-man company operating in the UK; while a dental surgeon explains he turned down 557 
an offer of a full service facilitator but collaborates with referral facilitators; and a third one 558 
collaborates with a full service facilitator but no ‘brokers’. While findings may be inconclusive about 559 
whether MDs have a preference for one type of facilitators over the other, the rationale behind their 560 
course of action is underlined by an effort to maintain control over the business relation. 561 
Table 1. Study participants 562 
Specialisation No 
Past/present Collaboration 
with referral facilitator  
Past/present Collaboration 
with full-service facilitators 
Cardiac surgeons  2 1 out of 2 specialists - 
Plastic Surgeons 9 5 out of 9 specialists 1 out of 9 specialists 
Eye surgeons 2 1 out of 2 specialists - 
Dental Surgeons 9 4 out of 9 specialists 2 out of 9 specialists 
IVF specialists 6 3 out of 6 specialists 1 out of 6 specialists 
Hospital Senior Managers 2 1 out of 2 hospitals 1 out of 2 specialists 
Psychologist in IVF clinic 1 N/A  N/A 
Midwife in IVF clinic 1 N/A  N/A 
 563 
There are two limitations that need to be acknowledged. First, not all participants referred to their 564 
relationship with facilitators. A small minority had no form of collaboration or seemed to have no 565 
concern from their interactions. Moreover, the findings could possibly gain further insight from 566 
examining the perspective of facilitators with regards to their interactions with MDs in Greece. This 567 
would potentially give a more rounded view of their relationship and it is the aim of future research. 568 
6. MDs’ PERCEPTIONS OF FACILITATORS 569 
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As described earlier, dominance is a term employed to refer to subordination of other occupations 570 
in healthcare provision. It emphasises dominance in the division of labour where nurses, pharmacists, 571 
technical and often administrative personnel ‘were obliged to work under the supervision of 572 
physicians and take orders from them’ (Freidson, 1985: 13). Interviewees’ accounts, analysed under 573 
the dominance narrative, are presented in three sub-sections. First, it is shown that after the initial 574 
contact between the agent and the practice, a business relationship is often established. It is then 575 
highlighted that the attitude of professionals towards facilitators has two dimensions; on the one hand, 576 
the latter are deemed necessary, and on the other, they are met with suspicion. Finally, it is 577 
demonstrated how suspicion soon turns to politics and professionals often deny or stop collaboration.  578 
6.1. Establishing a Relationship 579 
When MDs describe the initial push factor to turn to foreign clientele it becomes obvious that 580 
medical tourism facilitators have played a crucial role. Following a number of interviews it became 581 
clear that facilitators, mainly web-based companies from the UK, have approached a significant 582 
number of MDs in Greece. Facilitators often inform MDs about developments in the field 583 
(international business fairs, changes in EU law, findings of relevant surveys etc.) and at the same time 584 
promote their services (online marketing services or representation to foreign markets etc.). A dental 585 
surgeon explains: 586 
‘They call you to international conferences for medical tourism, they inform you about exhibitions 587 
you may join […] until 2008 the emails I would receive from such companies were almost more 588 
than the emails I would get from patients’ (Dental Surgeon A). 589 
 The search for partnership is bidirectional; professionals also initiate contact and may advertise their 590 
services through multiple facilitators. Their collaboration may be short-lived or last for years while 591 
some professionals depend solely on facilitators’ web-promotion for advertising. A plastic surgeon 592 
mentions,  593 
‘I use a company […], I use it now for six, seven years, perhaps even more…when they were starting, 594 
I was starting too. And it has helped me a lot…’ (Plastic Surgeon A). 595 
6.2. Necessary But Unreliable  596 
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When asked about their perceptions of facilitators, medical doctors acknowledge that their role is 597 
crucial in channelling patients to their practice. MDs may have limited knowledge over foreign 598 
markets and, considering the relatively small size of their practices, it may not be easy to reach out to 599 
a sizable pool of overseas patients. 600 
 ‘There was a need and they were created […] they simply facilitate the whole operation, because a 601 
website needs a lot of referrals to be found in a good position in Google results. An independent 602 
site like ours, for example, cannot appear high. Theirs […] has many referrals and it is easier to 603 
find audience’ (Plastic Surgeon A). 604 
Facilitators’ services are therefore valued; after all facilitators undertake tasks physicians often 605 
have no time, knowledge, or skill to do. Several medical professionals discuss how they are too busy 606 
with patient consultation and treatment, leaving no time for the promotional efforts of the practice. 607 
Some also confess that their skills are restricted to medicine and marketing is a task they are not 608 
trained for. While they acknowledge the importance of promotion, others explain they are not willing 609 
to be personally involved in the marketing process as it is a dull task that offers little job satisfaction. 610 
It often comes down to the same conclusion about facilitators, 611 
‘So they are necessary. They are necessary to bring people in. A man cannot do everything. I am 612 
for example a doctor […] I do not have the time, knowledge, the ability to do everything’ (Dental 613 
Surgeon J). 614 
Knowledge plays a significant role in professional politics as it defines the boundaries of work 615 
(Abbott, 1988). In particular, professionals maintain exclusive rights to perform tasks based on their 616 
recognised expertise in an area. Internationalisation of the market, however, demands a new set of 617 
skills that medical professionals realise they do not possess. Within the dynamic environment, thus, an 618 
occupational vacancy is created (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005), changing the established 619 
boundaries of work. In this case the vacancy is not related to medical skills; core tasks such as drug 620 
prescription, diagnosis, or treatment are not contested. The vacancy concerns brokerage and 621 
marketing.  622 
Nonetheless, MDs appear reserved and cautious. Their expectations of facilitators are not fulfilled 623 
for a variety of reasons. Professionals often refer to unrealistic promises in the expected outcomes by 624 
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facilitators or express scepticism over the way patient inquiries are handled; discouraging a number of 625 
professionals from establishing collaboration.  626 
‘So they choose providers…after I paid the fee they told me they have three IVF centres in Athens 627 
that they refer clients to. But how? Rotationally? I am not sure how it works…I am not even sure 628 
whether all inquiries were real or set up. There is no way I can know that’ (IVF expert A).  629 
Information asymmetry potentially passes control to agents over prices, the services, and the 630 
choice of providers. Medical professionals often feel there is lack of transparency in the pricing and 631 
advertising practices of facilitators and no information mechanisms to monitor their activities. These 632 
attitudes demonstrate alienation to the way facilitators run their business and, close to this, 633 
dissatisfaction or hesitation. It is notable, however, how such attitudes conceal a latent contestation 634 
over who controls the terms of collaboration. The excerpt below shows how the quoted professional 635 
insinuates little understanding of the pricing strategy of a referral facilitator right after he describes it 636 
in quite some detail. Though not stated explicitly, hesitation is arguably a matter of politics, 637 
 ‘There is an issue with how they function. They say I advertise you, yes, but if you want to be 638 
advertised a bit better, you will have to give me more money […] or I will advertise you for free 639 
but from all incidents you get you will give me 15% of the revenue, all these are a bit dodgy…it is 640 
not clear how it works’ (Dental surgeon H). 641 
6.3. It Soon Turns To Politics  642 
Relatively quickly, the expression of hesitation and doubt turns explicitly to politics. Several MDs 643 
realise that a new actor may gain power over their work. The sociology of the professions explains 644 
how professionals strive to maintain control over the organisation, distribution, and trade of their 645 
production (Larson, 1977; Abel, 1988). The special relationship between the doctor and the patient 646 
has been also analysed as a facet of medical power (Hughes, 1958); characterised as intimate and 647 
paternalistic, one where MDs define the terms of communication (Carvalho and Nunes, 2013). It is 648 
exactly such balances that ‘medical tourism’ facilitators threaten to disrupt. It is the facilitators’ role 649 
to mediate between the patient and the doctor, through this they influence the rules of trade, the fees, 650 
and to some extent the conditions of work of medical professionals. Unsurprisingly, most participants 651 
feel challenged by the necessary, albeit intrusive, new actor. A dental surgeon explains that facilitators 652 
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are useful for his practice, but appears dismissive of mediating services that go beyond simple 653 
advertisement and referrals. The doctor-patient relationship is of strategic importance for MDs, and a 654 
third party intervening is not particularly welcome; initiatives for patient handling and further 655 
involvement are dismissed as irrelevant. 656 
‘For example, someone wanted to create a website; to choose specific MDs; provide specific 657 
services and be the manager of the whole thing. Because obviously wherever there is money 658 
everybody wants to get involved […] but to my mind the level of doctor-patient is so personal that 659 
the success of such a thing is particularly difficult’ (Dental Surgeon D). 660 
Furthermore, micro-level autonomy refers to the right of professions to define their fees and own 661 
conditions of labour (Flynn, 1999: 22). Medical professionals comment on how facilitators challenge 662 
these aspects of their autonomy, resenting a relationship of dependence. No matter how necessary, 663 
dependence upon facilitators concedes leverage which is a cause of concern.  664 
‘Since Greece has not established a brand name for medical tourism, you have to be involved in 665 
the process of collaborating with them in terms that they define and you have to follow’ (Cardiac 666 
Surgeon A).  667 
Some professionals acknowledge that ‘brokers’ obtain power as they offer intermediary services 668 
which go beyond informational services. Portals in particular offer a ready platform which numerous 669 
providers may easily join for an annual subscription or payment per reference. Facilitators may 670 
contract medical providers in a range of destinations revealing that international competition is stiff 671 
and scarcity in medical skill unimportant within the niche market. As a result, professionals who seek 672 
to internationalise their services are alarmed by the increased options and the negotiating power of 673 
facilitators they are in contact with, 674 
‘See for example what happened to hoteliers in Crete… the tourism agents push them hard to 675 
reduce their prices…they say we don’t care…we will send our customers to Turkey or 676 
Spain…imagine this happening to dental care! So, as you see, one ought to be careful with 677 
intermediaries’ (Dental Surgeon J). 678 
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Another surgeon mentions friction as inhibiting collaboration and addresses the issue of power and 679 
control. Fees and commissions are often perceived as high; but who defines the fees clearly plays an 680 
important role, 681 
‘They [colleagues] talked with some companies from the UK and could not agree in prices. 682 
Namely, they considered the commission the office would take was extremely high; we do not 683 
want to work in dependence. Most MDs, this is how they work, and most MDs in [name of 684 
hospital]…this is why it [the hospital] was created, it belongs to doctors. We do not have 685 
agreements with insurance companies, funds etc., so that we define our price. If we get into the 686 
process that others define our reward, eh, there we do not really like the thing...if we do not agree. 687 
And this is where collaboration stops’ (Plastic Surgeon G). 688 
Characteristic is the example of another professional (plastic surgeon F) that does not hesitate to 689 
stop collaboration with a representative in the UK who has been his basic source of patients for 690 
several years. He suggests that the agent started secretly to charge a high fee to each patient, which 691 
was exceeding his own and, consequently, reacted by interrupting collaboration.  692 
Even when medical professionals control the division of labour, their efforts to maintain control 693 
must be constant (Abbott, 1988: 71 & 73). The decisiveness in interrupting or turning down 694 
collaboration with facilitators is part of the maintenance process. Expanding to a new market where 695 
their dominant position is not sustained does not appear a good option.  Looking at it from another 696 
perspective, the stance of MDs functions as an impediment for facilitators that wish to penetrate the 697 
Greek market and potentially aggregate the supply-side. Though MDs understand the importance of 698 
intermediating services they hesitate to rely on facilitators even when they appear as a viable ready-699 
available way to expand to foreign markets. If they would not be dissatisfied facilitators would have a 700 
better access to the Greek supply-side and, therefore, the share they typically require (15-20% 701 
according to interviewees) from the related patient expenditure. For as long as collaborations are 702 
interrupted, penetration to the Greek supply is delayed or inhibited. Negotiating commission and other 703 
rules may appear particularly provocative to Greek private practitioners who are not used to 704 
managerial or financial control by third parties. As discussed earlier, neither the private hospitals as 705 
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employers, nor insurance funds as payers, have done so until today. A manager working in one of the 706 
two largest hospitals in the country explains that, 707 
‘Clients of the hospital are not the patients. The doctors are. They bring patients into the hospital 708 
and they get paid for that’ (Senior Manager B). 709 
In that sense it is not surprising that medical professionals feel threatened by the interventions of 710 
the facilitators. The question over what professionals ideally want from facilitators remains. The 711 
overall impression is that they are content to work with facilitators when their fees are low; or when 712 
facilitators are exclusive representatives. It is also interesting to note that specialisation does not 713 
account for differences in response to facilitators; both dental and plastic surgeons, and 714 
gynaecologists are vocal in expressing their concerns. The reaction of MDs in Greece highlights how 715 
institutional inertia supports the continuation of professional dominance amidst contextual changes. 716 
MDs engaging in a young, niche market attempt to disrupt the growing power of facilitators in its 717 
infancy; as Netting and Williams suggest ‘old habits die hard’ (1996).  718 
7. CONCLUSION 719 
With services gaining increased importance in global production, international trade in services 720 
flourishes (Sako, 2013), and healthcare forms no exception. Yet, the transnational healthcare business 721 
sector appears far from settled. Health insurance is largely confined to national borders, medical 722 
providers are increasingly internationalising changing the global supply map, and the intermediaries’ 723 
business sector is unstable and, to an extent, unreliable (Cormany and Baloglu, 2010; Turner, 2012). 724 
Within Europe, despite the Directive on Patient Mobility, Greer and Rauscher (2011) describe 725 
developments as ‘negative integration’ as opposed to market formation, emphasising the impediments 726 
in intra-European trade. This paper has examined an aspect of market development which highlights 727 
the meeting of medical providers in Greece orientated to the internationalisation of their operations 728 
with specialised agents. As such it pays attention to small medical practices in their path to 729 
internationalisation as opposed to large, resource-rich organisations (hospitals) in the supply chain. 730 
The problem identified pertains to the ambivalence of medical professionals towards facilitators. This 731 
ambivalence is disentangled through the conceptual framework of the Sociology of the Professions, 732 
leading to a theory-informed insight into why trust is difficult to establish between the two actors. 733 
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According to the Sociology of the Professions, MDs typically work in relations characterised by 734 
power asymmetries titling to their favour. Drawing on their expertise they set the terms of 735 
engagement and define the behaviour they adopt towards other stakeholders in the delivery of 736 
healthcare. In this study, MDs acknowledge that facilitators have increased leverage in their business 737 
relation. The leverage that facilitators have is based on their ability to aggregate the supply side (and 738 
thus expose MDs to international competition with both small and large providers across a number of 739 
countries); the ability to aggregate the demand-side (and thus have control over a client base MDs 740 
wish to have access to); and by association the opportunity to intervene in the patient-doctor 741 
relationship (by defining conditions of communication/interaction between patient and doctor or as 742 
patient advocates). As such, the development of a facilitator-MD relation understood as mutually 743 
beneficial is undermined and MDs in Greece often interrupt collaboration (Figure 1). Practically, this 744 
implies delays in the internationalisation path of MDs; less chances for facilitators to further 745 
collaborations; and, thus, slower development of the market. Lee and Fernando (2015) analyse the 746 
‘medical tourism supply chain management’ in Malaysia and highlight the significance of trust and 747 
commitment among business partners. They suggest that, though first efforts to develop the sector in 748 
Malaysia date back to 1997, ‘a lack of understanding of the advantages brought about by the medical 749 
tourism supply chain still plagues the industry’ (2015: 155). This paper offers insight, to practitioners 750 
and scholars alike, into why trust between two of the supply-side key actors, in a different 751 
geographical area, has been a challenge. The findings show how professional norms and expectations 752 
may work out as factors dissuading the development of the market (Ormond et al., 2015); establishing 753 
mutually advantageous relations between ‘business’ partners in a new field cutting across borders and 754 
two industries (health care and tourism) may prove demanding; in Greece it arguably involves 755 
deliberations by medical professionals underpinned by healthcare micro-politics.  756 
Overall, the international business arena appears attractive but bears challenges for medical 757 
professionals. The fact that numerous small practices in Greece (and elsewhere) strive to 758 
internationalise their services shows the potential for further market expansion. Yet, the new 759 
environment functions under different rules and incentives as Glinos et al. (2010) aptly comment, and 760 
this paper offers insight into how medical professionals orientated to the internationalisation of their 761 
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operations experience these new dynamics. As such it informs the sociology of the professions of new 762 
market-driven challenges for MDs engaging in international trade. The global market increases 763 
competition as scarcity of medical skill is surmounted; and emphasises the entrepreneurial and 764 
business aspect of medical services. It denudes MDs of their social role which typically fortifies their 765 
position and strengthens their influence over policy-makers. Consequently, the ability to negotiate 766 
terms and conditions for their services when they confront facilitators in the internationalised context 767 
is further attenuated. Perturbed by these dynamics, MDs explore trade options with caution; while 768 
their motives are financial, long established relations that underpin continuing medical dominance are 769 
carefully considered.  770 
While it is difficult to generalise conclusions without comparative studies, findings remain 771 
informative and relevant to destinations beyond Greece, where facilitators come in direct contact with 772 
medical professionals running small medical providers. Participants discuss, after all, how numerous 773 
agents get in touch to advertise their services and explore opportunities for collaboration. As 774 
facilitators routinely contact numerous practitioners in different destinations, similar issues may very 775 
well arise elsewhere, leading MDs and facilitators to an arduous search for business partners.  776 
The findings are also relevant to tourism practitioners. Healthcare politics may be all too familiar 777 
(no less due to lived experiences) to public sector practitioners, managers in private/public healthcare 778 
organisations, and policy makers in a number of countries. There is nothing new with the idea and 779 
practice of MDs striving to perpetuate privilege in their changing relations. In contrast, actors with 780 
little background in healthcare provision are naturally less endowed to reflect on healthcare politics 781 
and professional norms. After all, MDs working for large private hospitals do not deal with facilitators 782 
and, therefore, the issues discussed in this study are not observed. In light of this, it may be hard for 783 
facilitators (or practitioners in the tourism sector) to understand why an MD would not continue with 784 
a profitable collaboration, as this study suggests. Business is about profit. Professionalism, in contrast, 785 
is much more than that, even when privately practiced and driven by profits. By association, it is hard 786 
to reduce MDs to business people the very moment they try to internationalise their services. This 787 
study encourages, thus, tourism practitioners (including facilitators) to consider certain aspects in 788 
MDs’ stance and behaviour as emanating from pre-existing professional norms and attitudes within 789 
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the healthcare sector. More broadly, interdisciplinary endeavours often challenge those involved due 790 
to lack of basic understanding of diverse logics dominant in different sectors. Tourism practitioners 791 
are, thus, encouraged to consider that MDs prioritise the ability to define their own fees and terms of 792 
communication, strive to maintain an intimate relation with patients, and to avoid control over their 793 
content of work in any possible way. 794 
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 The Philippinese company PMTI (http://www.philmedtourism.com) offers complete medical travel programmes. Medical 
doctors and/or members of their families are partners of the company (last retrieved 7/7/2011). Two out of five members 
of the directors’ committee of the German Med2Heal are medical doctors and three out of four of the New Zealand’s 
MEDTRAL (http://www.medtral.com) directors are MDs (last retrieved 7/7/2011). Furthermore, the president and CEO of 
the French facilitator ‘My Treatment Abroad’ (http://www.mymedicaltreatmentabroad.com/) is an MD himself (last 
retrieved 7/7/2011). CEO of the UK based portal The Medical Tourist Company (http://themedicaltouristcompany.com) is a 
medical doctor as well (last retrieved 7/7/2011). 
 
 
